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The recent American election will undoubtedly inspire concern in Europe in that 
it appears to have endorsed security policies featuring the assertive use of force and the 
explicit disregard for established provisions of international legal restraint. Such policies 
have been pursued by the Bush administration against the judgment of European allies, 
many of whom fear that actions derived from those policies have done more to stimulate 
violence than to contain it.  
 
I personally share those concerns and acknowledge their validity. I want to 
provide some mitigating perspective, however. The outcome of the American election 
was determined primarily by domestic social issues, and the electorate does not endorse a 
belligerent foreign policy. President Bush’s margin of victory was significantly less than 
statistical expectations for an incumbent candidate under prevailing economic conditions, 
and can be attributed largely to religious conservatives expressing their opposition to gay 
marriage and abortion practices. The war in Iraq diminished political support for the 
president, draining away much of the extraordinary surge he enjoyed as a result of the 
2001 terrorist attacks. The underlying attitudes of the American electorate are well 
aligned with those in Europe on the fundamental issues of security policy, as are the 
inherent interests of our respective societies. Moreover, there are very powerful 
circumstances that will predictably drive us into yet more intimate collaboration for 
purposes of mutual protection.  
 
In the time I have available I will not be able to defend those judgments in full 
detail, but I hope to provide a summary that will encourage and perhaps help to direct 
your own reflections on the matter.  
 
The American Election 
 
Statistical expectations of the election outcome are regularly issued in advance on 
the basis of models that relate historical voting patterns to local economic conditions six 
months in advance of the election and to other standard determinants of voting behavior.1 
They provide a baseline assessment abstracting from the details of candidate personality 
                                                 
1 See “2004 Presidential Election Model,” Global Insight, http://www.wmrc.com/pdf/us-election-summary-
sept04.pdf; James E. Campbell, “Introduction – the 2004 Election Forecasts,” PS vol. XXXVII, No. 4, 
October, 2004, pp 733-735, PSOnline www.apsanet.org.  
and immediately topical issues, and their predictive record is quite good. Most of the 
models projected a larger margin for President Bush than he actually achieved.  
 
The fact that his election victory occurred despite a sharp divergence between the 
president’s policies and voter attitudes is strikingly revealed in polling that was done both 
in advance of the campaign season and in the final stages of the election process.2 In 
particular it is evident that Bush supporters substantially misperceived both the evidence 
about Iraq and the details of Bush administration security policies in order to bring their 
partisan preference more in line with their underlying attitudes.  
 
Regarding Iraq: 
– 72% of Bush supporters incorrectly believed that just before the war Iraq had 
major WMD programs. In contrast 26% of Kerry supporters believed that. 
– 57% of Bush supporters incorrectly believed the Duelfer report confirmed Iraq’s 
possession of WMD. 23% of Kerry supporters so believed. 
– 75% of Bush supporters incorrectly believed there to be a significant connection 
between Iraq and al Qaeda. 30% of Kerry supporters believed that. 
– 56% of Bush supporters incorrectly believed that the 9/11 commission confirmed 
a connection between Iraq and al Qaeda. 27% of Kerry supporters so believed. 
   
 Had those assessments been more accurate, it apparently would have made a 
difference. 58% of Bush supporters and 92% of Kerry supporters believed that the US 
should not have initiated war against Iraq in the absence of major WMD programs and 
links to al Qaeda.  
 
 Regarding more general security policies, Bush supporters substantially 
misperceived his position on international treaties, incorrectly believing that he supports 
– The land mine treaty (72%), 
– The CTBT (69%), 
– The ICC (54%), 
– And the Kyoto protocol (51%). 
 
 Again, those misperceptions apparently serve to make President Bush more 
acceptable to those dedicated to supporting him for other reasons. The American 
electorate as a whole solidly supports the major international security treaties and the 
underlying principle of international cooperation. Specifically: 
– 87% support the CTBT 
– 73% support enhanced international inspection of nuclear activities. 
– 92% support international inspection of biological laboratories. 





                                                 





The Evolution of Security Policy 
 
 In the aftermath of the election it is probable, but not inevitable, that the Bush 
administration will pursue security policies that are more aggressive and less aligned with 
international law than either the American electorate or European allies would advocate. 
In particular the administration is likely to prosecute its objections to nuclear material 
production programs in North Korea and Iran by attempting to impose political isolation 
and threatening the use of force without offering the constructive incentives – most 
notably, credible security guarantees – that most careful observers believe are essential to 
any reasonable resolution of those issues. Similarly the administration is likely to 
continue to block efforts by the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva to initiate 
negotiations on preventing an arms race in outer space. On that issue the United States 
stands virtually alone against the rest of the world.  
 
 As a practical matter, however, these assertive ventures are very likely to be 
contained by circumstance if not by majority judgment. The US operation in Iraq has not 
succeeded in establishing the conditions necessary for a stable government to emerge, nor 
has the more broadly accepted operation in Afghanistan yet established the conditions for 
successful reconstruction in that country. It would be a great deal more difficult and 
probably infeasible to initiate new ventures of this sort against substantially more capable 
opponents while the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan remain as troublesome as they 
currently are and are likely to remain. Those direct constraints will also be reinforced by 
the domestic fiscal deficit that will predictably impose increasingly severe restrictions on 
all US government operations. The tax policies of the Bush administration have made it 
highly reliant on the inflow of foreign investment capital to finance large fiscal and trade 
deficits, and that fact does put some limit on its ability to defy international judgment. 
Although that limit has not yet been visibly encountered, it is nonetheless an implicit 
restriction of major significance.  
 
 Over the longer term, moreover, circumstances are likely to impose yet more 
consequential implications. It seems evident that international security practices have not 
yet adjusted to the emerging conditions of globalization to the extent that will ultimately 
be necessary. The large scale, readily observable and intentionally organized forms of 
aggression that were the dominant concern of the twentieth century are less immediately 
threatening than they were once considered to be, but more extensive social interaction 
and expanded access to destructive technology has made smaller scale and more 
dispersed forms of civil violence of much greater concern. Although any given instance 
of civil violence can be absorbed and contained, the aggregate potential is a serious threat 
to the global economy and to the basic legal order required to operate it productively. 
That potential cannot be contained by the standard methods of contingency reaction in 
which traditional military forces have specialized. It will have to be addressed by 
methods of prevention more effective than any yet devised, and that in turn will 






  Against the smaller scale, more spontaneous, more widely dispersed, more 
clandestine and less readily attributable forms of violence that are apparently emerging as 
the primary international security problem, firepower is in general less decisive. 
Information and justification are both more important. Insurgents and terrorists can 
readily be defeated if they can be located. They are dangerous to the extent that they can 
embed themselves in a society willing to protect and support them. They are especially 
dangerous if they can acquire access to either of the two technologies truly capable of 
mass destruction – nuclear explosives or virulent biological pathogens. The basic method 
of protection against violent individuals and the technologies they might use is mandatory  
disclosure. If they cannot hide, they cannot threaten.3
 
 Although the fact is not yet widely admitted, the traditional methods of acquiring 
security information – remote observation and illegal spying – are far too inefficient and 
ineffective to provide adequate protection against smaller scale forms of violence. The 
activities and the materials required to conduct sporadic clandestine operations are too 
readily hidden to be detected by these methods. Forced disclosure systematic enough to 
hold such operations below a tolerable threshold of consequence could only be achieved 
by intimate collaboration among essentially all organized societies. The purpose would 
be to set standards of behavior and to provide for the exchange of information required to 
monitor compliance. That in turn would require fundamental security accommodation. 
Residual forms of military confrontation will have to be subordinated to protective 
monitoring if insurgents and terrorists are to be denied the capacity for social destruction 
on a significant scale. 
 
 The techniques of protective monitoring are potentially quite powerful. In 
principle all financial transactions and all commodity flows could be continuously 
tracked if we were determined to do so. Similarly, systematic oversight of biological 
research and global accounting of nuclear explosive materials could be initiated with high 
standards of accuracy and protection against unauthorized access if we wished to do so. It 
is predictable that we will eventually wish to do at least some of this and, indeed, that 
protective monitoring is likely to become a central feature of international security 
arrangements. The development of those techniques will require a substantial change of 
political attitude, however, and legal specification sufficiently robust to protect against 
misuse of the information gathered. It will also predictably require a substantial revision 
of legacy security policies – especially the doctrine of preemption recently proclaimed by 
the Bush administration. No country can be expected to allow international monitoring of 
its nuclear material holdings if it is simultaneously subjected to a threat of preemption. 
                                                 
3 The logic of protective monitoring and the role it might play in the transformation of international security 
relationships is discussed in John Steinbruner and Nancy Gallagher, “Constructive transformation: an 
alternative vision of global security,” Dædalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
Summer 2004, pp. 83 – 103. 
Until all countries do allow that, protection against insurgent access to these materials 





 Over the next decade or so, it is reasonable to expect that the techniques of 
protective monitoring and the various issues they raise will be pursued primarily in 
connection with the management of nuclear materials and biotechnology. As noted, the 
misapplication of those two technologies would in principle allow a small clandestine 
operation to directly cause massive social destruction. None of the other technologies 
popularly included in the mass destruction category have comparable potential. The 
technical details of protective monitoring in each of these two areas would be very 
different, but the underlying reasoning and basic principles would be the same.  
 
 For different reasons protective monitoring techniques are also likely to be 
discussed in application to space activity over the next decade. In several official 
documents, the United States is currently proclaiming an intention to dominate the use of 
space for national military advantage, and that intention is considered by China in 
particular to violate the basic provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, which provides the 
basic framework for international legal regulation. There is an incipient collision of 
policy and of principle which ultimately will have to be resolved, and it is plausible that 
protective monitoring techniques will play a significant role in the resolution.  
 
 It is also plausible to expect significant interest in applying protective monitoring 
techniques to the problems of post conflict reconstruction that will predictably be a 
central security concern over the next several years. That implies, however, the 
monitoring of individuals, organizations and small arms flows, all of which are likely to 
be a great deal more difficult and more controversial than the monitoring of massively 
destructive technology. Probably the simpler, less intrusive and more compelling 
applications – nuclear materials and biotechnology -- will have to be mastered before the 
more demanding ones could seriously be attempted, but that is something that remains to 
be seen.       
            
 Over a yet longer span of time – two decades or so – protective monitoring is 
likely to become a compelling concern in connection with the global warming 
phenomenon. In that application it might well come to be known as preventive 
monitoring. We have all been authoritatively warned by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), that human induced carbon gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
will have to be sharply restricted if the risk of triggering catastrophic shifts in global 
climate patterns is to be contained within prudent bounds. Higher standards of protection 
in that regard would require a dramatic transformation in global patterns of energy 
production and use. It would be very difficult to accomplish that without something like a 
tenfold increase in nuclear power generation. For that to be even remotely acceptable in 
security terms, the entire nuclear fuel cycle would have to be much more carefully 
managed than it currently is, and protective monitoring techniques would have to be 
developed to a very high standard. That situation has strong potential to restructure 
international security relationships quite profoundly.  
 
The Problem of Terrorism 
 
 Let me conclude my remarks with a few comments on the problem of terrorism. 
As all of you are undoubtedly aware, it has been the dominant focus of concern in the 
United States since the events of September 2001. But I am afraid emotions on this 
subject have well outrun serious reflection. In particular we have not yet understood that 
our reactions to these events have caused far more damage than the events themselves. 
We cannot know whether that was actually the intent of the perpetrators, but it certainly 
has been the principal effect.  
 
 It will be important for the United States and the rest of the world as well 
eventually to come to understand that the form of terrorism demonstrated on September 
11 is basically an autoimmune disease, whereby perpetrators incapable of undertaking a 
decisive direct assault attempt to provoke self-destructive reactions within the victim’s 
society. There are many effects of that sort that have occurred, the most significant of 
which has been the massive disruption of international social relationships by means of 
visa restrictions, export controls and various other things that have served to impede 
international interactions. It is difficult to know how long it might take us to moderate 
this instinctive reaction and begin to reverse the extensive damage it has done, but we 
could certainly use all the help we can get.  
 
 That truly essential task is complicated by the fact the autoimmune reaction is not 
entirely irrational. The malicious intent and operational capacity demonstrated on 
September 11 went well beyond the bounds of previous experience. That makes it very 
difficult to know what the scope of danger might be. We are obliged to assume that the 
people who conducted the attack would use mass destruction technology if they were 
able to do so, and that assumption does plausibly justify the perception of imminent 
threat underlying the preemption doctrine. For that reason it compounds the danger of 
autoimmune reaction. One can interpret the Iraq venture as evidence of that 
compounding.  
 
 In this situation I believe it is essential to develop the logic and the practice of 
protective monitoring as rapidly as possible. That is the most promising and most 
constructive focus for the impulse for preventive effort that has risen in the United States 
in the wake of the terrorist assaults. I urge those of you who are alarmed by the election 
and by the apparently unjustified wielding of military power to purse the constructive 
alternative.  
 
 With that plea in mind, I close with what I hope is a constructive observation: 
There is opportunity in danger, but it requires wisdom and dedicated effort to develop it.             
 
  
